4 of the population in France is unlikely

A scenario is not the future reality, but a means to represent him to inform the action presented in the light of the possible and desirable future. The scenarios have credibility and usefulness than if they meet five conditions for the rigour: the relevance of the variables, the consistency of assumptions, the likelihood (can show that said the most likely scenario has in General and better than 15 chances in 100 of realized), the importance of the consequences of scenarios and their transparency.

Three balancing macroeconomic and social scenarios developed by the sounds on the horizon 2035 for the France have the merit of being clear baptized. The quality and consistency of the demonstration are as well the appointment. Pity that the choice of these three scenarios is not more explicit and especially the rejection in the shadow of others is not informed. The question of the likelihood of scenarios is obscured by the beeps as indeed most often in this kind of exercise. When a group of experts prepared, he realizes his inconsistencies and cognitive biases which led him to accept some scenarios rather than others it would have been as interesting to cross these scenarios with those that we have recently built (1) around the ageing: grey, the pink (the golden age of gray hair) and black (of the war of the ages to beggar). They objected that the main objective of these three scenarios was to reflect the key stakeholders. In my case, the objective is achieved as evidenced by the following comments.

Let's start with the invariants. Some smile as "the absence of influence what happens in France on world prices." The opposite would be a real break. Others such as: "the euro effective exchange rate remains stable" are little credible over a long period. The past has shown strong fluctuations of exchange rates of the dollar against major European currencies by a factor of one to two. The yo-yo of alternately high and low dollar have all chances to reproduce in the future, not on the policy of reserves of China crowded by the hundreds of billions of surpluses from the US.

The most important and least credible of invariants is demographics. The trend of increase of 0.4 of the population in France is unlikely. Scenarios here sounds appears. One must put the France in the context of an ageing Europe which does not replace its generations. Projections of labour force are known: between 2010 and 2030, Europe will see the 16-24 age bracket down 7 million, that of the 25-54 age will decrease by 25 million, while that of the 55-64 age will increase by about 9 million people. These arms and drain on paper will, because nature abhors a vacuum and demographic projections lead to inevitable to important migration flows towards Europe. Which is good news for growth: well the Spain out in front of the growth of the GDP in the euro area, with more than 3 in average since 2000, is twice the EU average, it is because the immigration of assets which increased the population of 1.5 per year, or more than the United States1.1. Recall in this connection that, since a quarter of a century, the gap of about one point annual average economic growth between the United States and Europe is explained for the most part (80) by lesser population dynamics.

In France also, it must expect a massive migration of assets to meet the needs of the labour market in the trades of services to people and in the construction industry. What should make projections of the beeps like those of Insee by the facts. And it is happy, because, otherwise, the simple demographic projections lead Europe to a potential growth divided by two by 2030 around 0.8 instead of growth of per capita GDP 1.7 (projections of GDP per capita of the scenarios of the sounds are in the range of 1.1 to 1.7).

To achieve such economic growth without population upheaval and avoid soft grey hair growth, the beep is forced to appeal to the international application (exports can go up to represent 40 to 50 of GDP against 25 today to 20 in 1990). It is true that the Germany is already 34, but its industrial competitiveness base allows it to respond to the request of the major markets of Asia. This is not the case of the France of the 35 hours, which only surplus positions are the agri-food and tourism.

If the French continue to work the equivalent of six weeks less per capita than the United States and three weeks less than the average European, they are unlikely to see grow their standard of living. And do we not illusion on our high apparent labour productivity, it is primarily an indicator of exclusion of those who do not run fairly quickly. Where the low employment rate of young people and senior citizens, only the new arbitration case manages to meet. The other two scenarios are therefore not desirable from the point of view of the creation of wealth. But to pass the anticipation to action, should probably simulate other alternatives, including rupture in the foundations of our social model.